Preliminary Outlines of Integrated Adaptive Consensus (formally IDN)

Introduction:

Given the historical tendency for sociological power structures to progress towards decentralisation, transparency, and equality; emergent challenges appear on the horizon; those that represent a fundamental re-constitution of authority, merit and value structure. We could call the first iterations of these communities post-democratic or participatory economies since they operate under, interdependent, trust-based, non-hierarchical, or de facto meritocratic governance without reliance on arbiters or representatives. For these communities, the means of living have become identical to the goal of living, whereby day-to-day affairs are the very basis that constitutes both the evolution and purpose of the place and its populous. These are historically uncommon since their founding tenets rely on reaching healthy equilibrium between diverse peoples with a common set of values that are at once mutually upheld and granted space to adapt and flow as abiding dialectic. No one person or group establishes self-serving principles by abusing the free allocation of personal autonomy. When viewed in terms of spiral dynamics[1], we are talking about the emergence of stage Yellow, Turquoise, and Coral communities. It may be fair to attribute these stages as being holistically evolved iterations of stage purple.

The need for sans-personal systemic organisation

Within the domain of large multinational corporations, there is an obvious need to interface with software that off-hands information for running operations under a rubric that approximates and informs those farther afield in time and experience from the genesis of the company's founding principles. As technology has progressed, we have gone from crude means of communication to metasystems that handle many forms of communication under one integrated housing, and are more or less autonomous in back-end information processing. These innovations have cut down on sloppy intermediary administration so that tasks more succinct with the core goals of a business can constitute a higher proportion of the workload. It's becoming increasingly evident that intelligent programs, such as algorithms and neural networks, are capable of eating into still greater sections of that which remains. However, the dream of meta-systems becoming fully autonomous whilst also remaining concomitant with human control will likely elude us. The best approximation may be an open-source pseudo-autonomous version of an ideal metasystem. A vivid example of what such a system might become is to imagine that humanities values were sealed in an envelope and that an artificial intelligence was given the goal of correctly assessing its contents by working alongside and studying human thought and behaviour, all the while serving us toward that ever-changing palette of concern[2]. Why is this pertinent to democracy in newly developing communities? Because people span a multidimensional spectrum of personality traits, capabilities, and levels of development, and are just as capricious in fallibility. A robust community makes space for the entire diapason of humanity, lest it becomes unpalatable and consequently subject to external upheaval. Thus the case for a consensus-driven adaptive protocol to bring to light long-standing but neglected problems that fall between the cracks that are symptomatic of even highly-developed groups. A representative, accountable, decentralised system which actively reflects and moves in concert with the community. Providing a safety net that facilitates the purview of all personalities to develop harmoniously without undue conformity or discomfort.

So what are the subtle disadvantages of these aforementioned communities and how might they be addressed by this protocol? At root, the difficulties are spun out from a single inextricable bind. How does an unaccountable system handle its unaccountability? In other words, where do you draw a line, who draws it, and on what authority? In a democracy with no hierarchy where the power structure is undefined, certain responsibilities can fall between any given person's prerogative. It is accounted for surreptitiously by passive or unconscious deference. Inertia

intrinsic to the methodologies laid down by older generations tends to persist or slowly erode. It's analogous to being given a paintbrush and being asked to paint when the canvas is water. Demolish the borders (existent framework) and you destroy the structure which held the water; paint the water and your brushstrokes become diffuse and muddied by the relativity within; at which point you may not feel inclined to wield the paintbrush. Other names for this phenomenon are the bystander effect, status quo bias, and the "committee meeting effect". All of which describe powerlessness inculcated by everyone holding equal power. There are some limited exceptions, particularly in participatory economies. A natural hierarchy of competence is not inherently oppressive. Nevertheless, there is a certain inevitable tendency for roles to become ingrained through self-reinforcing social dynamics that subtly condition and filter members into their zone of habit, comfort, or deference.

Secondarily, there is potential for a blind cul-de-sac. This is differentiated from a cult and happens due to low requisite variety[3], typically born of selection bias. Any community formed under a precisely descriptive banner that does not actively compensate for its social leanings is subject to selection bias. This means that, on average, a non-random subset of the population will be drawn to becoming members of said community. The outcome is a group composed of an insular cross-section of viewpoints, blind to how their ideology is unbalanced when re-framed by insights that are not present, precisely because the group members are unknowingly or obstinately blind. Consequently, the situation persists until a tipping point is arrived at by chance, social movement, or new management. Typically, communities establish a healthy enough equilibrium, balancing their values with a desire to be accessible to a wide enough selection of beginners, clients, guests, and outsiders. However, there are other, more nuanced mechanisms behind the blind cul-de-sac. These, highly developed groups are more prone to, as they lie beyond the trappings of closed-minded ideology and dogma. In the first instance, an agreeable combination of high living standards and amiable interpersonal relations may produce sanguine, easy living environments that are comfortable and agreeable, but also opaque to innumerable means of growth. A diverse fracas of people and beliefs often unearth challenges that incite movement and questioning, expanding the perimeters of thought into possibilities that would otherwise remain dormant. A further possibility is that a community is sufficiently balanced and sophisticated, but still blind to parameters of intelligence and experience until exposed by probing or happenstance. Humans would still be using candles for lighting had the discovery of electromagnetism not been chanced upon. These are not issues unique to highly developed groups, but among such groups, the ceiling of collateral damage may be higher, since they are configurations that may engender a uniquely poised, potent, and socially fringe convergence of knowledge.

One corollary of open systems in which there are no codified rules is that people are free to act in the knowledge that their doings will not incur specific after-effects, besides the potential for distaste and communal forum. There is no guarantee that a decisive course of action may result. It becomes a matter of internal social vigilance among all parties to act in the tacitly understood interest of all parties, and those who are not cleanly inducted into this fine arrangement are liable to be clumsy in their use of personal agency. It will then fall to the other members to pick up the pieces after the fact, without recourse to a tangible account as to why the problem occurred and thus may be averted in the future. By the same token, community members are apt to share many commonalities in their proclivities, so a lopsided filter to ideas may present itself, and this filter can offer resistance to "external" ideas that are outstanding, but prone to indifference when presented in discussion. In other words, there is no clear mechanism for ideas to be mandated and trialled in the interest of productive exploration, despite contention. Exploration is also negated when situations arise where some individuals are reticent about their desires and insights out of a timidness to inconvenience or disquiet other members.

Another wrinkle is what could be called a mousetrap problem or authority cascade problem. Within unconventional schools of thought and practice, highly ordered and precise systems of behaviour and ritual are set in motion. This is equivalent to spinning plates on sticks to the end of developing concentration. When all is in accordance, no disturbance is present to be amended. However, when a single individual falters in the consistency of their awareness, another must move to compensate for this error, which causes them to falter from their balance, which in turn causes several others to do just the same until all members are embroiled unnecessarily. This can occur if one or more persons are overzealous with their freedom and power. A peaceful state can devolve into an authority game, because another member(s) will have to rise in authority as a response to the person(s) in question if they are to prevent them from enacting change by their own will, and then their authority to act out of the norm is liable to be questioned by others. Additionally, when the flat management landscape of an organisation is fresh and regularly rotated, no one person likely has a feeling of personal ownership or authority regarding incongruous happenings. For instance, if one member begins to subtly exploit other members, it is far easier not to intervene, as It would be hard to extract or distinguish the differentiation between personal affairs and matters of institutional concern. This effect applied broadly, can result in situations where everybody is aware of a problem and aware that everyone else is, but nobody dares touch the situation, for fear of getting roped into a public furore.

The most intuitive and prevalent methods of resolving issues such as these are typically a mix of consensus-based forums, non-violent communication practices, and grievance procedures. However, the complexity of a social milieu scales exponentially. The on-the-ground utility of these practices is typically confined to small gatherings and meetings within hierarchy-based institutions. At higher levels of decision-making, it is too arduous to meticulously sift through the psychological makeup of every member's particularised needs and specialities across the board at a moment's notice. One could simplify such a system to a yes/no show of hands democracy, but this is a crude oversimplification. Usually, businesses lay down a codified, time-tested heuristic for each area, such as HR and logistics, which are nested within more and more maladroit management categories. These essentially entertain faux pluralism by gathering feedback on a predominantly need-to-know basis and observing how the sounding board for each area lights up in response. For example, conglomerated notices from several HR branches across the country that the budget for staffing is inadequate. Correspondence and means of action are then marshalled to this tune. A presumptive account of what occurs on the ground that does not accurately surmise each member's ongoing sentiment.

The solution? Semi-fluid authority structures (theory)

Let's return to the most antagonising problem present with the flat consensus schema. The muddied whirlpool of relativity one creates in trying to make an indentation of personal expression in a flat and disordered social space. To return to the painting analogy from before, imagine that instead of the brushstroke becoming diffuse the moment it touches the water, the water is programmed to crystallise precisely at the point of the brush as it touches the surface so that a clearly defined mark can be made across the surface. In time, the mark either becomes an ongoing feature of the water's constitution, or dissipates to varying degrees, but the 'smart water' remembers the mark and this informs all painters of their next move. After a period of experimentation, the water may be drawn into a shape that resembles a superior bounding box for the water and the 'smart water' will allow this shape to become its new container, such that the properties of the water take on a new form. The civic bargain is to agree to crystallise (vote) for the sake of another member, knowing that the process is (or will become) fair, non-biased, and embodies deeper wisdom than any single painter. The moment there is discord in this agreement the water reverts to a previous container, or if this persists, it simply loses its programming. This process exacts a simulacrum of reality, whereby creatures emerge from homogeneity via convergent evolution and affect their

environments, which then affect the creatures in ways that change the ways the creatures affect their environments, and so on. The key difference here is that the process is conscious, democratic, and egalitarian so that insular feedback loops are headed off. Unlike natural selection, an accountable, reversible, non-competitive backbone is built in to process, as if a species could see its innumerable genetic pathways mapped out. Our minds require ossified models to gain valuable strategic purchases on variables in existing processes, and so we have a timeline to cleanly measure and contrast progress.

An analogy will aid this intuition: Imagine you had never encountered a worm, and suddenly you find one traversing your picnic. You have to make an impromptu decision. Either you can risk watching the worm to see what it does, or find a way to oust it for fear of it ruining your lunch. Now repeat the scenario, but this time the worm is in a glass box suspended over the picnic, so it will function as if it were in the picnic, but you are now free to observe the trails the worm makes over the glass surface and whether its actions might be beneficial or otherwise. At this point the trail imprint (schedule) on the box can be used as an experimental heuristic and approved for trial or vetoed; all within and through the box system itself. Changes are never brought about by personal edict and there is no recognised way of acting with authority external to the system. Therein is the difference the IAC protocol makes in providing a safety net that does not diminish individual contribution to the group.

The core dilemma with consensus is it tries to circumvent human fallibility with a model that is wholly dependent on human modes of thinking. This is predictably problematic in ways that history and statistics demonstrate, and are not intuitively obvious to our limited perception. It's like asking a friend to help you lift a rock. You are both less likely to slip or drop the rock from fatigue; regardless you are both a liability. An inflexion point occurs where adding further people only increases liability and not functionality. If you rather use a machine to lift the rock, you are swapping out your liability with a simple, transparent system, so that if it fails, it does so in a predictable and manageable fashion, because what is difficult for it is easy for you and vice versa. You are trading liabilities for strengths, and covering each other's weaknesses by harmonising two internally inconsistent systems instead of one. Two internally inconsistent structures complete each other via one providing the backbone for the other. If a bone breaks, the muscle holds it in place, if a muscle tears, the bone provides support. In pure consensus communities, there is a single internally inconsistent process that engulfs all individuals, but any individual is capable of rupturing the system —defying consensus by holding human sentiment hostage. The traditional consensus method only functions adeptly if all members of a group are perfect agents in a game theory scenario[4] where each person acts with complete information, making ideal value judgements commensurate with the group and individual interest (good luck defining that). It would be like a fish that utilises its muscles in such harmonious unison that no spine is necessary to anchor its motion. However, a fish with no spine and elastic muscles is thrown into a complete self-annihilating spasm when a signalling error occurs, because there is no skeletal segmentation for the muscle to contract within to prevent the spasm from propagating across the entire body. Likewise, consensus-only communities must maintain a wooden, peaceable nature to avoid hidden flaws in the system from being exposed to a point of total failure. One of these is rejecting consensus forum using consensus, in so far as this voice must be heard, otherwise, it cannot be claimed to be a consensus-based process.

Before delving into the nuts and bolts of the IAC proposal, it is crucial to affirm that the details of the seed protocol shown here are for example purposes, and may be poorly calibrated for actual use. What matters is that the general framework and principles are robust enough to seed a theorised scenario in the future.

General network overview (figure 1)

Please refer to figure 1 for a top-down overview of the guts of the potential system. The purpose of having two layers, one mutable and one semi-immutable is to delay or buffer changes to the protocol that might undermine some of the features that make it internally robust from the outset. The semi-immutable layer is the heart of the system and the mutable layer is the capillaries and secondary organs. Mutable layer changes can come into effect swiftly and evolve rapidly, but semi-immutable changes require greater levels of external forum and thoroughfare to bring into effect. The number of layers and in which layers the parameters belong is subject to change, but this can only be enabled through the first (semi-immutable) layer, or at least until that should change. There is no element of the protocol which cannot be subject to change given sufficient time, signifying that figure 1 could be iterated into a completely unrecognisable form in the future, but it would probably only reach that stage if a virtuous cycle developed from the initial axioms.

Candidate voting and veto (figures 2 3 & 4)

Given the example network and parameters displayed in figure 4, the weekly vote rate in this example is one week. In this case, everyone is given a digital or physical approximation of figure 2 to complete privately over a week. Voting data is not disseminated to avoid political tactics (the only obfuscated aspect of IDN).

The number of participants is 20 and you are given 4 votes, both to pad out the numbers and to encourage a reduction in favouritism. Your candidate topic is the change(s) that you would like to see brought into effect, discussed, or flagged for community notice. If you are unelected, you may forward your previous topic to the current week. You may also choose to defer your candidacy if elected, although you are still part of the voting cycle if you defer (you also lose your topic for the week). The current candidate topic is the winning candidates topic from the previous week, which may be vetoed unless the prior candidate used their VE (veto exception), in which case it can only be prevented by a super candidate's VER (veto exception rejection). If the current topic goes through it is overseen by the next week's candidate, who is required to publish a schedule/document including this change. If no one is willing to participate in this change it can only come into effect through collaboration with the original proposer, who will need to provide the resources of his/her own back. The forwarded candidate topic comes into effect if the previous topic was vetoed, in which case the topic may be approved for discussion (~>50%) as part of next week's schedule. This provides a space for the topic to be addressed and to work through the reasons it was rejected. The voting system in this example goes through a veto stage to encourage change, but this can be modified into an approval rate.

Referring to figure 3. This is an example of a vote tally for week 4 of a ~5-week cycle. I have chosen week 4 to demonstrate the nuances of the voting system. The participants are initially divided into a majority, minority, and lowest 25% (minority includes the lowest 25%) according to votes received. The next column is the ~weighting/randomness factor. The merit of introducing chance is that it allows for sorting within each of the majority/minority groups and keeps candidacy selection slightly unpredictable. The range of chance permitted should be narrow otherwise voting is redundant. Half votes are given to those who receive none to enable sorting by chance. If this were not so, it would be possible that most or all of the minority and lowest 25% receive no votes, making it impossible to distinguish the two categories. There are (as of this example) 6 conditions placed on voting results: ~maximum constitutive wins with no minority; ~consecutive minority votes for a win; ~lowest 25% win threshold; ~total consecutive unelected threshold. If your consecutive wins (per cycle) with no minority is 3,0 it rules out your candidacy. Each of the other conditions are win conditions that trump one another from left to right. The reasoning behind this is to sample candidates for representation if they repeatedly fall short, to give them a chance

to build trust and have their voice heard. However, this is not a case of merry-go-round syndrome, where everybody gets equal turns and voting is redundant. The favourable candidates will be elected most of the time during the first weeks of a cycle when the other conditions cannot be met (except total unelected). Also, frequently elected candidates can become super candidates (over an agreed number of cycles) which allots an additional VE and a VER. Using a VER is powerful and usually reserved, so doing so will forfeit your next candidacy. Total consecutive unelected is an ongoing tally unbound to cycles that trigger when the total number of participants plus a threshold number of weeks unelected is met. This ensures that if a participant gets perpetually stuck in the middle ranks of the vote tally they will eventually be elected. The threshold should be high enough to not trump the favourable candidates frequently, and if the system is healthy it will seldom be used. After the votes are sorted by probability adjustment the candidates are re-categorised and this data is remembered for the next voting round.

I have not included a method by which the previous schedule could be reinstated if the new paradigm inadvertently shifts participants into a compromised state. It could be included as part of the voting process, although the addition of more vote topics starts to become superfluous. Ideally, the schedule would not alter dramatically with each iteration. The depth of change tolerated could be handled by additions to the protocol. The protocol does not need to integrate a scheduling system as in the examples, as other modes of correspondence can take place under its auspices.

Protocol voting

Included in the voting form is a protocol change checkbox. If enough members opine that the protocol is flawed or could be improved then a new round of voting using something akin to the form in figure 4 is enacted. Here, the fine interplay between semi-immutable and mutable parameters can be tweaked, and the amount of tweaks per change is set as part of the parameter web, to facilitate a safe distance of hard-coding between users; the degree to which can only be changed through an independent IAC review. If this proves overly complex it is possible to precipitate anecdotal feedback alone into the required changes. Alternatively, it can be agreed to revert to a previous version of the system. I have not delineated the means of doing so as part of the protocol, but this could span a show of hands consensus to a formal vote. Independent reviews are a necessary feature to prevent extraneous modifications from snowballing and to collate feedback to evaluate the efficacy of the democratic process. It is an opportunity to make larger-scale alterations to the protocol without working solely within its framework. The process could be handled via the traditional consensus methodology. Possibly chaired by the super candidates. These periods are crucial for embedding overarching plans and due process measures into the items and agenda schema for the coming months/years/cycles. The tasks or events that are deemed necessary can be pre-emptively input into the calendar or schedule.

Candidacy and scheduling

After the voting week for the cycle begins, the current candidate is decided and becomes the default representative for the week. Meaning they chair meetings and respond to in-house inquiries unless they should defer or be incapacitated. In this example, they are tasked with the responsibility of drawing up the schedule/document for the previous candidate's topic if it passed the veto stage. Forwarding in this way prevents personal agenda from inciting conflict and ensures that changes are never brought about by direct personal edict. The purpose of cycles is to set a rolling dynamic framework in place which allows for metrics to be measured to limit bias and introduce countermeasures to candidate dominance. This framework can then be updated in the interval between cycles. When there are no super candidates it belies a lack of confidence, which requires

experimentation to establish trust. This will likely occur since there is no possibility of using VER to prevent changes from being pushed through.

Meetings and impromptu amendments (+outstanding actions)

Meetings to update everyone of changes to the schedule are an integral part of the system, it's also recommended to allow impromptu amendments to be made to how the schedule/document is implemented in real-time. The current candidate can resolve outstanding actions by giving them a deadline on the schedule/document and is trusted to make the closing decision at the end of the meeting.

Conditionals and prime candidates

Despite every notable governance change requiring a threshold of confidence, it may be necessary to demarcate areas of sensitivity, such as finances, to ensure stability during times of rapid member induction or turnover. This would take the form of conditionals created from the founding of the community onwards, whereby a specific requirement (e.g. 100% consensus) must be met before any individual can take on or replace a facilitator of a high-stakes role or task. New conditionals must be able to be created and old conditionals subject to change or removal otherwise a power-hierarchy is established by the initial founders. However, the parameters of conditionals should not be adaptable by the standard candidate practices to ensure a degree of protection in that sector of the community.

One solution is to have a prime candidate(s) selected through consensus during IAC reviews, to review and propose changes to conditionals going into the next period. Another role for a prime candidate is to be a leader during emergencies or to preside over decisions that impose the need for quick turnarounds. In such a capacity they would have a background role in the community that is not felt in regular affairs.

Further considerations

The protocol can be adapted to fit the environment and the extent to which facets of a community are included as part of the decision tree can change. The protocol could become increasingly specialised or generalised, elements such as a community manifesto or the variant founding paper of the protocol could become integral elements, subject to continuous amendment. There is also the capacity for remote use because the winning candidates topic can be enabled by second party collaboration. It may be prescient to introduce vote cycle breaks to mull over periods of experimentation or simply as time off from the formal process. Factors for exclusion or anonymity could be baked into a protocol if required.

The system can accommodate new participants at any time. It should be made clear that the process lends itself to an all or nothing configuration, in the sense that if only half of a community is using it their decision-making process should be kept distinct from the other half, otherwise the structure being used is all for nought because it can be dismissed by an external authority not commissioned by the system itself.

Transparency and user-friendliness

The vision of IAC is to be completely open-source and transparent. The internals of the protocol should be available for any participant to view and comment on. The example protocol shown in this paper can be run completely in analogue without any user interface or software. However, for the sake of security and convenience, third party tools such as a specialised algorithm or blockchain could be used to handle voting data.

Seed protocols

The specifics of the parameters, voting and information handling shown in the IAC model presented is simply one compact example of a protocol seed. The starting conditions will affect a horizon of innovation that will expand and evolve as the wisdom of the crowd continues to shape the underlying axioms of the protocol. Some could start with a very simple set of axioms on a single layer and become increasingly complex and layered with time, or vice versa.

The ideal vision of this IAC proposal is to trail many versions, both separately and among the same groups, creating a natural selection process, until a seed with auspicious enough starting conditions blossoms into a virtuous and self-consistent cycle of development. Protocols all share the ability to be decommissioned by reverting to the prior (non-existent) protocol.

If and when a protocol is to become established, there may be potential for dispute as to which historic version best served the interests of the people, or other qualms of this vein. This could be grounds for forking the protocol in another direction. There is also the possibility for a synergistic merging of different protocols.
Perhaps the perfect scenario for IAC would be for it to slowly become obsolete as it gradually enables enough members to integrate the wisdom of a highly developed protocol into their psychological wheelhouse so that the codified version is no longer necessary.

Flaws and concessions

There are of course many questions as to the feasibility of IAC and similar schemes off-paper. As watertight as the founding axioms of any seed protocol may appear, they are still human dependent, and if enough participants are apathetic in maintaining a sensible protocol, they can unravel to varying degrees. Here is a selection of some potential issues:

- IAC requires traditional methods to bootstrap.
- There would be a requirement for non-trivial amounts of structural change to the protocol should it be scaled up or down significantly. For example, votes may have to be split into different representing groups of community members, should the size of the community exceed person-to-person relations.
- The protocol's ability to adapt extemporaneously is time-limited, which provides formal consistency, but is inadequate in casual or volatile social conditions.
- The protocol does not preclude the inclusion of a traditional consensus forum, but it may tacitly discourage it.
- The sophistication of such a model is its strength but it may be difficult for newcomers to welcome or understand. Engaged and informed participants are required for the system to function properly.
- Virtuous evolution is not guaranteed as a result of transparency, active sampling, and experimentation.
- The protocol can be susceptible to feedback loops if the rollback system is removed.
- As the system is not dictated, there is a risk of shortsighted abandonment, because it requires momentum and active commitment to maintain the process.

References

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiral_Dynamics

[2] Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies - Nick Bostrom 2014

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variety_(cybernetics)

[4] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory

Consensus Model



IDN Model



Figure 1


Schedule published
Independent IDN review (3m)
Administrator
No rejection, candidate topic comes into effect
Rejection
Veto exception used
Secondary protocol [mutable]
IDN
Core protocol [semi-immutable]
Protocol rework vote rate (?)
Voting
Return to prior protocol?
Change current protocol?
Veto threshold (60%)
Vote cycle (4w)
Weighting /randomness (?)
Electoral rate (1w)
Tweaks per protocol change (?)
Number/range of parameters (?)
Immutable parameter flexibilty
1 veto exception per cycle
Super candidates (elected x times per cycle)
Voting
If veto, only candidate topic forwarded
If no veto, changes come into effect
Candidate selection
+
Topical vote
Maximum consecutive wins (?)
Vote cycles for minority win (?)
Desired changes/ revert to prior schedule (?)
Candidate topic ~forwarded (Y,N)
(1w)
Experimental branch
Veto
Proposed schedule & Change list published
2 veto exceptions per cycle
1 veto exception rejection (VER) per cycle
Using VER forfeits next candidacy

Figure 2

IAC voting form / week 4 (~5 week cycle)

Your candidate topic (if any):

Forward previous? [ ]

Use (1) veto exception? [ ]

Candidates	~4 votes
A	X
B	
C	
D	
E	
F	X
G	
H	X
I	
J	
K	
L	
M	
N	X
O	
P	
Q	
R	
S	
T	

Current candidate topic (if any):

Veto exception used? [YES]

Veto unavailable | *~Super candidates only~* **Use (1) V.E.R? [ ]**

Forwarded candidate topic (if any):

Approve forum discussion? [ ]

Need for protocol change? [ ] | **If yes, revert to prior? [ ]**

Defer candidacy if elected? [ ]

Figure 3

Week 4 (~5 week cycle)

Candidates [super] (VE, VER used?)	Votes (wins/minority since last cycle)	Randomness factor (~0.85-1.15)	Cycle w/m threshold (~3,0, 0,4) met?	Cycle lowest 25% threshold (~5)	Consecutive unelected threshold (~n + 15)	Results
A (N)	10 (3,0)	0.86	Y			8.60 (N/A)
B (N)	9 (0,0)	0.87				7.83
C (Y,N)	7 (0,1)	1.13				7.91 (4^{th})
D (N)	5 (0,2)	0.93				4.65
E (Y)	4 (1,1)	1.09				4.36
F (Y)	4 (0,0)	1.04		1		4.16
G (N,N)	3 (0,2)	0.88				2.64 (Defer) (N/A)
H (N,Y)	3 (0,3)	0.86		1		2.58 (N/A)
I (N)	3 (0,1)	1.11			3	3.33
J (Y)	2 (0,1)	0.99			5	1.98
K (N)	2 (0,3)	1.02		2	1	2.04
L (N)	2 (0,2)	0.93			2	1.86
M (Y)	2 (0,3)	1.15		1		2.30
N (Y)	1 (0,1)	1.08		3	2	1.08
O (N)	1 (0,4)	0.91	Y	1		0.91 (2^{nd})
P (N)	1 (0,4)	1.05	Y	2		1.05 (1^{st})
Q (N)	1 (0,2)	0.85		4	1	0.85
R (Y)	1 (0,3)	1.10		1		1.10
S (Y)	0 +0.5 (0,4)	1.09	Y	2		0.545 (3^{rd})
T (N)	0 +0.5 (0,3)	0.96		2		0.48

Figure 4

IAC protocol voting form

Semi-Immutable parameters (for IAC review)

Electoral Rate: (1w)	Shorter [ ] Longer [ ]
Max mutable layer tweaks per protocol change: (4)	Less [ ] More [ ]
Immutable parameter flexibility: (Low)	Lower [ ] Higher [ ]
Range of parameters: (Safe)	Safer [ ] Riskier [ ]
Max protocol rework vote rate: (2w)	Shorter [ ] Longer [ ]
Veto exceptions per cycle: (1)	Less [ ] More [ ]
IAC review rate: (3m)	Shorter [ ] Longer [ ]
Mutable move threshold (55%)	Lower [ ] Higher [ ]
Candidate selection:	*comment bellow*
Voting / Veto system:	*comment bellow*

Add (for IAC review):

Remove (for IAC review):

Move to mutable (for IAC review):

Provide any reasoning behind the changes listed or further considerations here:

Mutable parameters (~4 available for immediate change)

Vote cycle: (5w)	[4w - **5w** - 6w]
Weighting / randomness: (0.85-1.15)	[.20 .25 **.30** .35 .40]
Cycle win threshold: (3,0)	[2,0 - **3,0 -** 4,0]
Cycle minority threshold: (0,4)	[0,3 - **0,4** - 0,5]
Cycle lowest 25% vote threshold: (5)	[4 - **5** - 6]
Super candidates elected (2) **times per** (3) **cycles**	[1 - **2** - 3] per [2 - **3** - 4]
Super candidates VER per cycle: (1)	[**1** - 2 - 3]
Consecutive unelected threshold: (n + 15)	[12 - 13 - 14 - **15** - 16 - 17 - 18]

Move to Semi-Immutable (55% threshold:

Provide any reasoning behind the changes listed or further considerations here:

An average will be taken of the mutable parameter results and input by the administrator. Semi-immutable parameter results and feedback will be collated for IAC review. Tampering, faux voting and collusion will be analysed and factored out.